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GESTATIONAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A CALL
FOR A THOUGHTFUL LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE
Abstract: Gestational substance abuse seriously threatens fetal health. Recently, many
states have prosecuted women who abuse drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. This Corn-
ment argues that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), should govern state intervention in
cases of gestational substance abuse. Because criminal prosecution fails to prevent gesta-
tional substance abuse, a state seeking to intervene should use civil commitment as the
means of intervention.
Gestational substance abuse' poses a significant risk to the physical
and mental health of an emerging generation of Americans. Because
abuse of cocaine and alcohol seriously threatens fetal health, the state
has a strong interest in preventing pregnant women from abusing these
substances. Recently, states have used manslaughter, child abuse, and
drug delivery statutes to prosecute women who abused drugs while
pregnant. Such prosecutions increasingly pressure state legislatures to
find a solution directly addressing gestational substance abuse.
State intervention in pregnancies, however, poses several problems.
First, states will face difficulty determining when intervention is per-
missible. States seeking to combat gestational substance abuse by
intervention should abide by the abortion rights guidelines articulated
in Roe v. Wade. 2 Although Roe held that a right to privacy protects a
woman's decision to abort during the first trimester, Roe does not pro-
hibit first-trimester intervention in cases of gestational substance
abuse. Nonetheless, legislatures should treat gestational substance
abuse consistently with abortion for reasons of public policy. Forbear-
ance from early intervention is the only way to reconcile intervention
with existing abortion law. Under this analysis, states can intervene
only after the first trimester.
Second, states must decide what form intervention should take.
Despite the recent increase in prosecution of pregnant substance abus-
ers,3 criminalization is an inappropriate response to gestational sub-
stance abuse. Traditional justifications for punishment fail to support
criminal liability. Criminalization also raises troublesome due process
and mens rea issues.
I. For purposes of this comment, gestational substance abuse means abuse of alcohol or drugs
by a pregnant woman.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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Civil commitment4 offers a better solution to the problem of sub-
stance abuse during pregnancy because it strikes at the heart of the
matter. Civil commitment directly addresses the problem, lacks puni-
tive aspects, and offers a potentially effective and long-term solution to
gestational substance abuse. A state using civil commitment to inter-
vene should adopt the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treat-
ment Act 5  (Uniform Act), amending it to include gestational
substance abuse.
I. THE LAW FAILS TO PROVIDE A CLEAR SOLUTION TO
THE SERIOUS PROBLEM OF GESTATIONAL
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
A. Gestational Substance Abuse Severely Damages Fetuses
No physical contact is more intimate than that between a woman
and her developing fetus. This close physical relationship creates spe-
cial problems when the woman is a substance abuser. A pregnant
woman abusing alcohol or cocaine harms not only herself, but also her
fetus.6 Recently, states have attempted to address gestational sub-
stance abuse by criminally prosecuting women who abuse substances
during pregnancy.7
1. Gestational Substance Abuse
a. Gestational Alcohol Abuse and Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
Use of alcohol during pregnancy poses severe risks to fetuses.
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) occurs in about one in a thousand live-
born infants.9 Serious damage suffered by FAS infants includes heart
4. A state has the power to commit for mental illness making a person either gravely disabled
or a danger to him or herself or others. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05 (1989). A state also
has the power to commit for treatment an alcoholic who poses a danger to him or herself or to
others. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
5. UNIF. ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT, 9(1) U.L.A. 79 (1988).
6. This comment focuses on damage caused during pregnancy by cocaine addiction and
alcoholism, because of great potential of these substances for causing fetal damage. See
Comment, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1210-18 (1987).
7. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
8. The damaging effects of alcohol may have been known since Biblical times. "Behold, thou
shalt conceive, and bear a son; and now drink no strong wine or strong drink ...." Judges 13:7.
9. Neri, Sammito, Romano, Sanfilippo & Opitz, Facial Midline Defect in the Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome, 29 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 477, 478 (1988).
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defects,10 mental retardation,1 and neurologic abnormalities. 2
Newborns with FAS are irritable, tremulous, and lack strong
reflexes.13
The extent and severity of the fetal damage may vary according to
which stage of pregnancy the woman abuses alcohol. Most alcohol-
caused damage occurs during the first trimester, when the organs of
the fetus begin-to form.' 4 Continued alcohol abuse causes additional
harm throughout gestation, however, because the brain develops dur-
ing the entire pregnancy.' 5 If a woman stops drinking during the sec-
ond trimester, the size and healthiness of the fetus will improve, but its
intelligence may not. 1
6
b. Cocaine's Unique Threat to Fetuses
Cocaine poses a unique risk to the physical and mental health of the
youngest generation of Americans.' 7  The singular threat posed by
cocaine stems from its relative popularity, particularly in the form of
crack, among young women.' 8
The most tragic aspect of gestational cocaine use is its potential to
cause permanent physical and mental damage. By depriving the fetus
of oxygen, cocaine use threatens fetal development.' 9 Malformations
of the urogenital, cardiac, and central nervous systems can result from
10. Id. at 478.
11. Id.
12. Clarren & Smith, The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1063, 1065
(1978).
13. Id. at 1065.
14. Dorfman, Alcohol's Youngest Victims, TiME, Aug. 28, 1989, at 60.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Sterling Clarren, Professor, University of Washington School of Medicine).
17. In the United States in 1989, 375,000 infants will have been exposed prenatally to illegal
drugs. See Fetal Endangerment Cases Increase, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8,
col. 4.
18. One study revealed that as many as fifteen percent of all pregnant women abuse drugs
during their pregnancies. Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1,
col. 4. Crack cocaine is a cheap, potent, and highly addictive smokable form of cocaine. See
Keith, MacGregor, Friedell, Rosener, Chasnoff & Sciarra, Substance Abuse in Pregnant Women:
Recent Experience at the Perinatal Centerfor Chemical Dependence of Northwestern Memorial
Hospital, 73 OBTTics & GYNECOLOGY 715 (1989) [hereinafter Keith]; Kaye, Elkind,
Goldberg & Tytun, Birth Outcomesfor Infants ofDrug Abusing Mothers, 89 N.Y.ST. J. MED.
256 (1989) [hereinafter Kaye]. Crack, unlike other illegal drugs, attracts equal numbers of male
and female addicts. See Alters, Women and Crack- Equal Addiction, Unequal Care, Boston
Globe, Nov. 1, 1989, at 1, col. 1. Using crack cocaine during pregnancy may be even more
dangerous than using other forms of cocaine. See Kaye, supra, at 258, 261.
19. Chavez, Mulinare & Codero, Maternal Cocaine Use During Early Pregnancy as a Risk
Factorfor Congenital Urogenital Anomalies, 262 J. AM. MED. A. 795, 798 (1989); see also infra
note 32 (discussing manslaughter prosecution for infant who allegedly died from cocaine-caused
oxygen deprivation).
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gestational cocaine abuse.2° Gestational cocaine use also places the
fetus at a greater risk of suffering a stroke at birth, which leads to
brain damage.2" Neurological problems caused by cocaine can perma-
nently affect motor skills, reflexes, and coordination.22 Infants
prenatally exposed to cocaine have lower birth weights2 3 and smaller
head circumferences24 than do infants born drug-free. The majority of
the fetal damage occurs during the first trimester, and it cannot be
reversed by ceasing cocaine use.2 5 Halting cocaine use after the first
trimester, however, improves fetal growth.26 Birth weights, lengths,
and head circumferences of infants exposed to cocaine only in the first
trimester do not differ significantly from non-exposed infants.27
2. The Recent Increase in Criminal Prosecutions
The prosecution of women who abused substances while pregnant,
particularly crack, increased significantly in 1989.28 At least ten
women in five different states were charged with crimes because of
gestational substance abuse.29 Charges included delivery of drugs to a
20. Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM.
1403, 1406-1407 (1988) [hereinafter Chasnoff, Drug Use].
21. Id. at 1407. This is particularly true when the woman used cocaine within a few days of
delivery. Id.
22. Id.; Chasnoff, Griffith, MacGregor, Dirkes & Bums, Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use In
Pregnancy, 261 J. AM. MED. A. 1741, 1744 (1989) [hereinafter Chasnoff, Temporal Patterns].
Cocaine-exposed infants may exhibit neurobehavioral problems such as irritability, tremors, and
stiffness. Chasnoff, Drug Use, supra note 20, at 1407.
23. Babies born to cocaine addicts weighed about 400 grams less than those born to a control
group. See Keith, supra note 18, at 718. Nineteen percent of infants born to cocaine addicts
were small for their gestational age, compared to six percent of the control group's infants. Id.
24. Chasnoff, Lewis, Griffith & Willey, Cocaine and Pregnancy: Clinical and Toxological
Implications for the Neonate, 35 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 1276, 1277 (1989). Cocaine-exposed
infants had average head circumferences of 33.1 cm., compared to measurements of 34.8 cm. for
a drug-free control group. Id. at 1277. All infants compared were of at least 38 weeks gestation.
Id.
25. Chasnoff, Temporal Patterns, supra note 22, at 1743-44. The rate of neurobehavioral
deficiencies remains the same whether or not the woman ceases cocaine use after the first
trimester. Id. Urogenital malformations are also associated with first trimester cocaine use. Id.
The risk of malformation does not decrease if cocaine use ceases after the first trimester. Id.
26. Id. at 1743.
27. Id. at 1743-44.
28. Sherman, supra note 18, at 1, col. 4.
29. Id.
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minor,30 criminal child neglect,31 and involuntary manslaughter.32
This flood of trials under laws not intended to prosecute gestational
substance abuse exposes the law's failure to balance adequately the
rights and interests of women, fetuses, and the state.
B. The Legal Difficulty of Balancing the Rights and Interests
Involved
The law fails to provide clear answers to the questions of whether
and when a state can intervene in a pregnancy affected by substance
abuse. Because abortion law involves the rights and interests of
women, fetuses, and the state, it provides insight into how a legislature
could approach state intervention in cases of gestational substance
abuse.
1. Abortion Rights
The United States Supreme Court has held that constitutional pro-
tections limit a state's right to regulate actions of pregnant women. In
Roe v. Wade,3 the Court invalidated a state statute criminalizing all
abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother.34 The
Court held that the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty" protects a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy.35
30. Jennifer Johnson of Florida was convicted of delivering drugs to a minor. State v.
Johnson, Sherman, supra note 18, 89-890-CFA (Cir. Ct. Seminole Cty. 1989). The court held
that Johnson delivered drugs to her baby via her umbilical cord in the moments after the infant
was born but before the cord was cut. The infant was Johnson's third cocaine baby. Johnson
received a sentence of fourteen years probation and one year in a rehabilitation program.
Johnson sought treatment, but an outpatient program refused to treat her because the center
feared liability should the fetus fail to survive withdrawal. See Sherman, supra note 18, at 28,
col. 2; Davidson, Newborn Drug Conviction a "Drastic" First, L.A. Times, July 31, 1989, § 1, at
1, col. 1. See generally Alters, supra note 18 (treatment often denied to crack-addicted women).
31. A judge dismissed child abuse charges against Cassandra Gethers of Florida, holding that
a fetus was not a child for purposes of the child abuse statute. Unborn Baby Not a Child, Judge
Says in Cocaine Case United Press International wire release, Nov. 6, 1989 (NEXIS, Omni
Library). But see In Re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1986) (fetus is a child
for purposes of child abuse statute); N.Y. Times, May 4, 1989, § A, at 22, col 2 (Illinois woman
convicted of child abuse for using cocaine during pregnancy).
32. Prosecutors sought charges against Melanie Green of Illinois, alleging that her cocaine
use caused her two-day-old daughter to die from brain damage induced by oxygen deprivation.
See Jury in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother in Drug Death of Newborn, N.Y. Times, May 27,
1989, § 1, at 10, col. 4 [hereinafter Illinois Jury]; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text
(discussing cocaine-caused fetal oxygen deprivation). A grand jury refused to indict Green
because of concern over her right to privacy. Illinois Jury, supra, § 1, at 10, col. 4.
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Id. at 118.
35. Id. at 153.
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Abortion therefore involves a fundamental right that the state may not
limit without a compelling interest.3 6
Two compelling state interests justify limiting a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy. First, the state has an interest in protecting
women's health.37 Second, the state has an interest in protecting
potential human life.38 Under Roe, during the first trimester of preg-
nancy, the state's interests are never compelling, and the state may not
intervene in a woman's decision to abort.39 After the first trimester,
the state has a compelling interest in women's health, which it may
protect by regulating abortion. 4  At viability-which the Roe court
considered the beginning of the third trimester41-the state's interest
in protecting potential human life becomes compelling, and the state
may prohibit abortions not necessary to save the life or health of the
woman.
42
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services43 recently modified Roe's
trimester system. In Webster, the Court upheld a statute requiring
physicians aborting pregnancies of twenty weeks or more to perform
viability tests to ensure that a viable fetus is not aborted.' The plu-
rality acknowledged that some modification of Roe was necessary to
support this decision. 45  Webster rejected Roe's trimester underpin-
nings, which the plurality criticized as "rigid." ' 46 Under Roe as modi-
fied by Webster, the state's interest in protecting potential life becomes
compelling at viability instead of the third trimester.
36. Id. at 155.
37. Id. at 148-50, 163.
38. Id. at 150-51, 163-64.
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id. at 163. The Court reasoned that a first-trimester abortion is safer than childbirth, but
a second-trimester abortion may be more dangerous than childbirth. Id. at 149-50, 163.
41. Id. at 160.
42. Id. at 162-64.
43. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
44. Id. at 3055-56.
45. Id. at 3056-57. The plurality conceded that the testing requirement imposes additional
financial costs on women seeking abortions, but reasoned that the requirement permissibly
furthered the state's interest in protecting potential life. Id. at 3056-57. The Court had
previously held that the state may not impose unjustified financial costs on abortion. See Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1983). Justice O'Connor
reasoned that the testing requirement was consistent with Roe. "No decision of this Court has
held that the state may not directly promote its interest in potential life when viability is
possible." Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3062 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
46. Webster, 109 S. Ct at 3056.
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2. Women's Rights
The Court continues to recognize that a woman's right to privacy
and personal liberty encompasses her decision to abort.47 Even as
modified by Webster, Roe protects a woman's right to decide whether
to abort her non-viable pregnancy. Additionally, Roe recognizes a
state interest in protecting a woman's life and health,48 which over-
rides the state's interest in protecting potential life. When the
woman's life or health is in jeopardy, Roe bars a state from prohibiting
even a post-viability abortion.49
3. Fetal Rights
Legal rights of the fetus vary according to the nature of the legal
claim.5" Under United States constitutional law, the fourteenth
amendment's protection of life and liberty does not extend to fetuses.51
Although Roe allows the state to prohibit post-viability abortions,52
Roe does not require states to protect fetuses. 53
Other areas of law provide the fetus with some legal protections.
Under property law, fetuses have the right to inherit.54 Tort law in all
jurisdictions allows a child to sue a third party for consequences of
prenatal injuries.5 When the child is prenatally injured by the
mother, however, results differ.56 Michigan would allow a child to
recover for maternally-inflicted prenatal injuries, on the ground that a
pregnant woman should bear the same liability as third parties.
47. Id. at 3057 (refusing to overrule Roe's protection of pre-viability abortion). For
additional discussion of the rights of women under Roe, see generally Gallagher, Prenatal
Invasions and Interentions: What's Wrong With FetalRights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 14-31
(1987); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal
Abuse'" 101 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1988).
48. Roe v. Wade; 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
49. Id.
50. For additional discussion of fetal rights, see generally Robertson, Procreative Liberty and
the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 437-50 (1983);
Comment, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty,
Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600-13 (1986).
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58.
52. Id. at 163-64.
53. Id.
54. Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108
(1987).
55. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 55 at 368 (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D.
Owen 5th ed. 1984); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. '!Third party" means someone other than the
woman carrying the fetus.
56. Compare Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988) with (Irodin v.
Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981).
57. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
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Some commentators expand upon this base, and advise adoption of
such a maternal duty of reasonable care in tort law and other areas.5
Another court, however, held that a maternal duty permitting such a
cause of action would adversely affect public policy by making a
woman the guarantor of the health of her fetus.59 Criminal law holds
third parties, but not mothers, liable for acts that harm a fetus. 6
4. State Intervention Rights
The law does not specifically define the right of the state to inter-
vene in the pregnancy of a woman whose substance abuse threatens
her fetus. The state has three legal tools with which to address the
problem: criminal liability, dependency proceedings, and civil
commitment.
The state has the power to criminalize conduct, 6I but no state has
yet enacted laws specifically imposing criminal liability on a woman
who harms her fetus through gestational substance abuse. States have,
however, used existing criminal statutes to prosecute women who
abuse substances during their pregnancies.62
A state's parens patriae 63 authority gives it the power to use depen-
dency proceedings to transfer the custody of a child from a parent to
the state.64 Prenatal substance abuse can be per se grounds for trans-
fer of custody to the state after birth.65 The parens patriae power also
58. Robertson, supra note 50, at 437; see also Dershowitz, Drawing the Line on Prenatal
Rights: When a Pregnant Woman Abuses Her Health, Should the State Intervene on Behalf of the
Baby?, L.A. Times, May 14, 1989, § 5, at 5, col. 2.
59. Stallman, 531 N.W.2d at 359-61.
60. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988) (unlawful killing of a fetus with malice
aforethought is second-degree murder); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060(b) (1989) (first degree
manslaughter includes intentionally killing a "quick" fetus by inflicting any injury upon the body
of the mother). Quickening is the first motion of the fetus as felt by the woman, and usually
occurs midway into the pregnancy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1122-23 (5th ed. 1979).
Criminal law may be changing to allow a mother to be prosecuted for harming her fetus. In
what may be the first case of its kind, a Massachusetts woman was charged with vehicular
homicide when her viable fetus died after an accident allegedly caused by the woman's negligent
driving. See Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1989, § A, at 4, col. 1. A fetus is a person under the
Massachusetts vehicular homicide statute. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d
1324 (1984).
61. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.10 (2d ed. 1986).
62. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
63. Parens patriae is a power used "to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health,
comfort, and welfare of the people." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
64. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34 (1989).
65. Cocaine Use in Pregnancy Amounts to Child Abuse, a Judge Rules, N.Y. Times, May 4,
1989, § A at 22, col. 2. But cf Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 42 Ohio App. 3d 171, 537
N.E.2d 721 (1988) (juvenile court may not exercise jurisdiction over body of addicted mother for
alleged benefit of fetus).
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gives the state authority to order treatment for a viable fetus in utero.
The state can compel a woman to submit to a caesarean section66 or to
a maternal blood transfusion for the benefit of the fetus.'
The state's parenspatriae power further permits the state to commit
persons for treatment. 68 Many states have adopted the Uniform Alco-
holism and Intoxication Treatment Act (Uniform Act). 69  The Uni-
form Act gives the state the power to commit alcoholics to an
approved treatment facility.70 Under the Uniform Act, the state may
commit a person who is either incapacitated71 by alcohol or an alco-
holic72 who poses a danger to others and is likely to inflict harm on
another unless committed.73
The Uniform Act requires procedural safeguards. Before an alco-
holic may be committed involuntarily, a physician must certify that he
or she examined the alcoholic.74 The court promptly hears commit-
66. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457,
460 (1981) (caesarean ordered where there was a 99% chance child would not survive vaginal
delivery and a 50% chance mother would not survive vaginal delivery); In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611
(D.C. 1987) (caesarean performed on terminal cancer patient), vacated, Matter of A.C., 539 A.2d
203 (D.C. 1988). But see Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983) (refusing to order
surgery to prevent miscarriage of a four-month fetus). See generally Gallagher, supra note 47, at
9-10; Note, Family Law-Court-Ordered Surgery for the Protection of a Viable Fetus, 5 W. NEw
ENG. L. REV. 125 (1982).
67. In re Application of Jamaica Hospital, 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S. 898 (Sup.Ct. 1985)
(maternal blood transfusion at 18 weeks of pregnancy).
68. For example, states can commit the mentally ill who are gravely disabled or pose a danger
to themselves or others. See, ag., WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05 (1989).
69. The Uniform Act has been adopted by Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa,
Kansas, Montana, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. UNIF.
ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT (UNIF. AT) 9(1) U.L.A. 79 (1988).
Washington recently amended its version of the Uniform Act as part of the Omnibus Drug Act,
an act addressing drug and alcohol abuse. 1989 WASH. LAWS ch. 271. Washington's version
invites comparison with the Uniform.Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A (1989); 1989 WASH.
LAWS ch. 271 §§ 305-309.
70. UNIF. ACT §§ 9, 14, 9(1) U.L.A. 91, 99 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.090, .140(1)
(1989). The Uniform Act does not presently provide for civil commitment of persons addicted to
or incapacitated by drugs. Cf WASH. REv. CODE § 70.96A.120(2), .120(4) (1989) (persons
incapacitated by drugs can be taken into protective custody for up to 72 hours).
71. Under the Uniform Act, "incapacitated by alcohol" means "that a person, as a result of
the use of Alcohol, is unconscious or has his [sic] judgment otherwise so impaired that he is
incapable of realizing and making a rational decision with respect to his need for treatment."
UNIF. ACT § 2(9), 9(1) U.L.A. 84 (1988); see also 1989 Wash. Laws ch. 271 § 305(7).
72. Under the Uniform Act, an "alcoholic" is "a person who habitually lacks self-control as
to the use of alcoholic beverages, or uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that his [sic] health is
substantially impaired or endangered or his social or economic function is substantially
disrupted." UNIF. ACT § 2(l), 9(1) U.L.A. 84 (1988); cf 1989 WASH LAWS ch. 271 § 305(1).
73. UNIF. ACT § 14(a), 9(1) U.L.A. 99 (1988).
74. Id. § 14(a)
385
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ment proceedings. 75 If the petitioner establishes a ground for involun-
tary commitment by clear and convincing proof, the court commits
the alcoholic.76 At the end of the commitment term, the facility
releases the alcoholic. 7' However, when a person has been committed
because he or she posed a danger to others, the facility applies for
recommitment if the danger persists. 8 If the likelihood of harm ends
before the commitment term, the facility discharges a person commit-
ted because of dangerousness.79
II. GESTATIONAL ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE SHOULD
BE TREATED CONSISTENTLY
Before the state can decide how to intervene in cases of gestational
substance abuse, it must define the predicate behavior that will trigger
state intervention. The state should consider both drug and alcohol
abuse when deciding whether to intervene. Abuse of either alcohol or
illegal drugs should establish predicate behavior for state interven-
tion.8" However, the state must narrowly define actions that will spur
state intervention, because due process requires fair notice of what
conduct constitutes a crime or predicate behavior for civil
commitment.81
State intervention predicated on drug versus alcohol abuse raises
different legal questions. Abuse of illegal drugs creates the most con-
vincing case for state intervention. Imposing sanctions on a pregnant
woman for abuse of illegal drugs is not a significant infringement of
75. Under the Uniform Act, a hearing must be held no later than ten days after the petition is
filed. UNIF. AcT § 14(b), 9(1) U.L.A. 100 (1988); cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.140(2) (1989)
(two to seven days).
76. UNIF. AcT, § 14(e), 9(1) U.L.A. 100 (1988) (30 day initial commitment, recommitment
up to 90 days); cf WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.140(5) (1989) (initial commitment up to 60
days).
77. UNIF. AT § 14(e), 9(1) U.L.A. 100 (1988).
78. UNIF. AT § 14(e)-(f), 9(1) U.L.A. 100 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.140(5)
(1989). The Uniform Act permits only two commitment reorders. UNIF. ACT § 14(f), 9(1)
U.L.A. 100 (1988). This limits total commitment time to 210 days. Washington does not
explicitly limit the number of recommitment orders. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A. 140(5)
(1989).
79. UNIF. ACT § 14(i)(1), 9(1) U.L.A. 101 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.140(8)(a)
(1989).
80. See supra notes 8-27 and accompanying text (damage caused by abuse of drugs and
alcohol during pregnancy).
81. The public must have fair notice of acts constituting criminal conduct. See W. LAFAVE
& A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3(b) (2d ed. 1986). Similarly, the public must have fair notice
of conduct establishing predicate conditions for civil commitment. See Hontz v. State, 105
Wash. 2d 302, 305-06,714 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (1986), reconsid. denied, (April 7, 1986).
386
Vol. 65:377, 1990
Gestational Substance Abuse
her rights, because there is no fundamental right to use illegal drugs.8 2
Therefore, the state need not show a compelling interest to forbid their
use by pregnant women. 3 Alcohol, however, is legal. Prohibiting a
pregnant woman from abusing alcohol thus represents a greater
infringement on her rights.8 4 Yet, like use of illegal drugs, alcohol use
is not a fundamental right, 5 and the state can and does regulate its
use.
The state should treat abuse of alcohol during pregnancy the same
way it treats abuse of illegal drugs. Penalizing pregnant drug users
while ignoring alcoholics is inconsistent and ignores the purpose of
intervention, because the root of both problems is the same: both
involve maternal addictions that endanger fetal health. If the state's
goal is prevention of fetal harm, then gestational alcohol and illegal
drug abuse must be treated similarly. To effectively prevent fetal dam-
age, and to be consistent, the state must intervene in cases of alcohol-
ism as well as drug addiction.
III. CIVIL COMMITMENT HARMONIZED WITH ROE IS
THE BEST FORM OF STATE INTERVENTION
Gestational substance abuse requires thoughtful legislative consider-
ation. State intervention in a pregnancy is an extremely intrusive
action. Using a non-intrusive approach, the state could generously
fund addiction prevention and voluntary treatment programs, with a
special emphasis on averting gestational substance abuse.86 Before
pursuing invasive solutions, the legislature should seriously consider
making voluntary treatment more readily available. Unfortunately,
however, prosecutors are calling for action and urging state legisla-
tures to enact laws specifically allowing prosecution of pregnant sub-
82. State v. Murphy, 117 Ariz. 57, 570 P.2d 1070 (1977) (marijuana use not a fundamental
right).
83. See Robertson, supra note 50, at 442.
84. But see Comment, supra note 6, at 1220-21 (alcohol use is a privilege regulated by the
state).
85. See Houser v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 803, 540 P.2d 412 (1975), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869 (1980). In Houser, the Washington Supreme
Court held that the" 'right' to consume alcohol is far from fundamental." Houser, 85 Wash. 2d
at 805-06, 540 P.2d at 414. Therefore, a state can regulate alcohol use if the regulation bears a
"rational relationship" to a state interest. Id at 806, 540 P.2d at 414. One manifestation of this
state interest is the recent law requiring labels on alcoholic beverages to warn of the dangers
posed by alcohol use during pregnancy. 27 U.S.C.A. § 215 (1988 & Supp. 1989). See also
Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1311-12 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (twenty-first amendment
-strengthens case for state regulation of alcohol); Comment, supra note 6, at 1220-21.
86. Pregnant addicts are often denied treatment. See Alters, supra note 18, at 4, col. 1.
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stance abusers.87 The state undeniably has a tremendous interest in
preventing fetal harm. Children physically and mentally88 damaged
by gestational substance abuse will require many additional state serv-
ices to meet their special medical, educational, and emotional needs.
Yet prosecuting the mother fails to protect fetuses from harm.
The state should use the guidelines established in Roe v. Wade89 to
determine when intervention is desirable. Although the Constitution
does not prohibit first-trimester intervention in cases of gestational
substance abuse, public policy and logical consistency require the state
to follow Roe's analysis and refrain from intervening until after the
first trimester.
Civil commitment after the first trimester is the best form of state
intervention. Any state intervention presents a dilemma: for interven-
tion to be consistent with abortion law, the state may not intervene in
the first trimester. State action after the first trimester, however, may
avert little harm.9°
A. The State Should Adopt a Roe Analysis to Determine When
Intervention Is Appropriate
State intervention to prevent gestational substance abuse may be
analyzed under Roe's framework, or under a theory requiring a mater-
nal duty of reasonable care. The maternal duty theory creates logical
and public policy problems. Roe's framework, although not constitu-
tionally mandated, is preferable both because abortion and gestational
substance abuse implicate similar rights and interests, and because
applying Roe achieves logical consistency.
1. Creating a Maternal Duty of Care Is Undesirable
Establishing a maternal duty theoretically allows first-trimester
intervention, by distinguishing a woman's right of privacy in deciding
whether to abort from her right of privacy in deciding whether to
abuse substances during pregnancy. A fundamental right to privacy
protects a decision to abort, but not a decision to abuse drugs or alco-
hol. Therefore, although a woman has a fundamental right to abort
during the first trimester, once she chooses to carry the pregnancy to
term she has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent harm to the
87. See Illinois Jury, supra note 32, § 1, at 10, col. 5; Davidson, supra note 30, § 1, at I, col. 2.
88. See Chasnoff, Temporal Patterns, supra note 22, at 1744.
89. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90. See supra notes 14-17, 25-27 and accompanying text (much damage occurs during first
trimester).
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fetus.91 The state can intervene if the woman breaches the duty of care
owed to the fetus, regardless of the stage of pregnancy.
The maternal duty theory presents an undesirable departure from
Roe's analysis because it conflicts with first-trimester abortion rights.
Under the maternal duty model, the state could intervene in early
pregnancy, when much of the fetal damage occurs.92 Yet although
first-trimester intervention does not legally conflict with Roe, it con-
flicts logically with Roe's protection of first-trimester abortion rights.
Prosecuting a woman for acts which harm her fetus is inconsistent
with her right to terminate the pregnancy. Additionally, although the
state may in theory have the right to intervene in first-trimester
pregnancies, it may not prosecute a woman for violating a maternal
duty unless the state could prove that she did not intend to abort.93
Imposing a duty of care on pregnant women would also have
adverse public policy consequences. A maternal duty renders a
woman the guarantor of the mental and physical health of her fetus.94
Requiring a woman to conform to an objective standard limits her
right to con'duct her life and pregnancy as she sees fit.95 Also, impos-
ing a duty may create an adversarial relationship between a woman
and her fetus: a woman might view her fetus as a potential opponent
rather than as a future child.96 Because of the potentially adverse
91. "Once she decides to forgo abortion and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman
loses the liberty to act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus." Robertson, supra note 50,
at 437; supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing establishment and rejection of a
maternal duty).
92. See supra notes 14-17, 25-27 and accompanying text (much damage occurs in first
trimester).
93. Many women may not literally "choose" to carry to term. For example, a poor woman
may be forced to carry her pregnancy to term because abortion is not financially an option.
94. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1988). See supra notes
56-59 and accompanying text; see also Robertson, supra note 50, at 442-43. A woman
conceivably could be liable for any preventable birth defect.
95. As the Stallman court stated:
By what judicially defined standard would a mother have her every act or omission while
pregnant subjected to State scrutiny?... In what way would prejudicial and stereotypical
beliefs about the reproductive abilities of women be kept from interfering with a jury's
determination of whether a particular woman was negligent at any point during her
pregnancy?
Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (1988).
For example, a pregnant vegan vegetarian may choose not to eat any animal products. How-
ever, the state could conclude that a "reasonable pregnant woman" would drink milk, thus
requiring her to conform to this objective standard or risk liability.
96. Imposing a duty could encourage abortions. If a pregnant addict fears that seeking help
for her addiction could expose her violation of a maternal duty and make her vulnerable to
prosecution, she may be more likely to abort.
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effects of a maternal duty on the lives of pregnant women, the state
should not impose such a duty.
The maternal duty theory might be improved by establishing a stan-
dard of recklessness, instead of negligence. Neither pregnant nor non-
pregnant persons may lawfully act recklessly. A recklessness standard
would allow pregnant women more flexibility in actions and decisions
potentially affecting the fetus.97 Nonetheless, a pregnant woman's
potential liability would still be greater than a non-pregnant person's.
This difference should make legislatures hesitant to impose a maternal
duty.
2. Adopting a Roe Analysis Is Logically Consistent
Because imposing a maternal duty of care is unsound as a matter of
logic and policy, the state should turn to Roe's analysis to determine
when it may intervene in cases of gestational substance abuse.
Although use of Roe is not constitutionally required, it results in
sounder public policy and a conclusion consistent with abortion law.
Gestational substance abuse and abortion involve similar rights and
interests. Yet, the Constitution does not require Roe to govern state
intervention in gestational substance abuse, because the resulting legal
concerns are not the same.98
The right of privacy articulated in Roe should prohibit the state
from intervening to prevent substance abuse in early pregnancy
because the state's interest in protecting potential life is not compelling
until viability.99 If the state lacks a compelling interest in first-trimes-
ter fetal life, then it lacks a compelling interest in first-trimester fetal
health. Without a compelling interest, the state cannot invade the
cloak of privacy protecting a woman's first-trimester conduct.'0°
Although the Constitution does not mandate this conclusion, Roe's
model of intervention harmonizes analysis of gestational substance
abuse with abortion rights law.
Under Roe, the state has the right to intervene after fetal viability.
Because the compelling state interest in post-viability potential life has
justified invasive measures such as caesarean sections and maternal
97. For example, a pregnant vegan's decision not to drink milk, or a pregnant Christian
Scientist's decision to seek alternative medical care, would probably not be reckless.
98. "[Als a matter of law, the right of a woman to an abortion is different and distinct from
her obligations to the fetus once she has decided not to timely terminate her pregnancy." In re
A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 614 (D.C. 1987), vacated, Matter of A.C., 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988).
99. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55, (1973).
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blood transfusions,101 similarly, this interest allows the state to inter-
vene after viability.
It is futile, however, to allow state intervention only after viability,
because most of the fetal damage happens during early pregnancy.1"2
Post-viability intervention may fail to prevent fetal harm. Nonethe-
less, departing from Roe is logically inconsistent with abortion rights
law and creates undesirable maternal liability. The state should there-
fore apply Roe by analogy, and intervene only after the first trimester.
B. Civil Commitment Is the Best Form of Intervention
A state electing to intervene must choose between criminalization
and civil commitment. Criminalization is a poor choice because it
lacks justification and raises mens rea and due process concerns.
Moreover, criminalization misses the central problem-preventing
fetal harm. Civil commitment under the Uniform Act both substan-
tively and procedurally suits gestational substance abuse. Commit-
ment lacks the punitive elements of criminalization, and strikes to the
heart of the issue by protecting and treating both the woman and her
fetus.
L Criminalization Is Unjustified and Complicated
If the state chooses the criminal law to address gestational substance
abuse, either by enacting a new statute specifically criminalizing sub-
stance abuse during pregnancy or by prosecuting pregnant substance
abusers under existing criminal statutes, it faces several problems.
First, the traditional rationales for criminal liability do not justify
prosecuting pregnant substance abusers. Second, if the state enacts a
new criminal statute to address gestational substance abuse, the state
will have difficulty selecting an appropriate mens rea standard. Third,
states prosecuting under existing criminal statutes may infringe upon
the due process rights of the defendants. Finally, because criminaliza-
tion fails to address the essential problem of maternal addiction, it fails
to accomplish the intended purpose of protecting fetuses.
Traditional justifications for punishments-restraint, general and
specific deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation' 3-- do not support
imposition of criminal liability. Criminal liability restrains a pregnant
woman from further gestational substance abuse only if the law moves
101. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 14-17, 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing first-trimester fetal
damage).
103. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 1986).
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quickly enough to incarcerate her while she is still pregnant. Further,
criminal sanctions are unlikely to either generally or specifically deter
pregnant substance abusers. Neither incarceration, nor the knowledge
that others are incarcerated, will encourage a woman to remain sub-
stance-free during future pregnancies. Addiction is not a moral weak-
ness curable by jail time."° Instead of deterring pregnant women
from substance abuse, prosecution may encourage them to get rid of
the "evidence" by aborting.
Retribution is perhaps the least persuasive reason to impose crimi-
nal liability on pregnant substance abusers. Although the goal of
many state sentencing plans is retribution," °5 punishing pregnant sub-
stance abusers who lack mental culpability fails to further this aim.
The state may decide that illegal drug use requires retributive punish-
ment, but the state can impose upon pregnant women the usual penal-
ties for possession or sale of drugs.
Although rehabilitation is the strongest justification for holding
pregnant substance abusers criminally liable, it too fails. The criminal
justice system is an ineffective way to provide rehabilitative treatment
for an addict. The jail may not be drug free. 106 Furthermore, states
may be under no duty to provide jail inmates with the same types of
addiction treatment as civilians. 107 Penal incarceration could thus
prevent a woman from getting the same treatment available to non-
inmates. 1 1
Additionally, although under Roe the state has the power to protect
a viable fetus threatened by gestational substance abuse, the state
should not use this power to punish a woman for harming her fetus.
Criminalization of gestational substance abuse would needlessly and
unjustifiably elevate fetal rights at the expense of the woman's rights.
If the state establishes a new crime, it faces the difficult choice of an
appropriate mens rea. The state could impose strict criminal liability
by punishing all women who abuse substances while pregnant, regard-
104. The Uniform Act states that the mere condition of alcoholism is not criminal conduct.
UNIF. ALCOHOL AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT, §§ 1, 19, 9(1) U.L.A. 83, 104-05
(1988). Similarly, a state may not criminalize the condition of drug addiction. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
105. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010(1) (1989).
106. "Jail [is] no place to get away from drugs." Fetal Endangerment Cases Increase,
Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8, col. 4 (quoting Walter Connolly Jr., attorney for
the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education).
107. Aripa v. Department of Social and Health Services, 91 Wash. 2d 135, 588 P.2d 185
(1978) (Washington's version of the Uniform Act does not give prisoners a right to treatment
under the Act).
108. See UNIF. ALCOHOLISM & INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT §§ 9, 14(h), 9(1) U.L.A.
91, 101 (1988).
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less of state of mind. Strict liability is troublesome because it imposes
penal sanctions on a woman without mental culpability. Alterna-
tively, the state could prosecute only those who knowingly abuse
drugs while pregnant. This standard fails, however, because the dual
elements of substance abuse and knowledge of pregnancy might be dif-
ficult to prove. An addicted woman might not know she is pregnant
until after the fetal damage is done. A third alternative is a reckless-
ness standard, but recklessness casts its net broadly.10 9 Because a
woman knows when she uses drugs or alcohol, the recklessness stan-
dard would apply to the element of pregnancy. The state could then
prosecute non-pregnant women who disregarded the risk of pregnancy
when using drugs or alcohol. The state would also find it difficult to
define substance abuse without penalizing casual users.
Although establishing new crimes presents mens rea difficulties,
prosecuting pregnant substance abusers under existing criminal stat-
utes raises a due process issue. Due process requires reasonable notice
that the act in question constitutes a crime. 10 Because statutes penal-
izing homicide, child abuse, and delivery of drugs to minors fail to
address gestational substance abuse explicitly, they deny pregnant sub-
stance abusers notice that their conduct could be criminal.111
Finally, criminalization fails to strike at. the heart of the issue.
Because criminalization does not attempt to cure the addictions which
cause fetal harm, it fails to protect fetuses from the dangers of gesta-
tional substance abuse.
2. Civil Commitment Addresses the Issues of Maternal and Fetal
Health
Civil commitment is a better solution than criminalization because
it focuses on the core of the problem, contains procedural safeguards,
and protects both the woman and her fetus. A state choosing civil
commitment should use the Uniform Act, and amend it to allow invol-
untary commitment of drug addicts as well as alcoholics.1 2  A state
109. Recklessness requires knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk that a wrongful act
may occur. See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(c) (1989).
110. See eg., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3(b) (2d ed.
1986).
111. Although possession of illegal drugs is already a crime, a pregnant addict has no notice
that her pregnant status allows the state to impose additional punishment.
112. For example, Washington's version of the Uniform Act includes the following definition
of a drug addict: "a person who uses drugs other than alcohol in a chronic, compulsive, or
uncontrollable manner, to the extent that it is seriously interfering with the individual's health,
economic or social functioning. Drug addiction is characterized by a compulsive desire for one
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should also amend the Uniform Act specifically to include gestational
substance abuse as part of the concept of posing danger to others." 3
The Uniform Act substantively and procedurally suits gestational
substance abuse. Its substantive limits prevent arbitrary commitment
and commitment of casual users. To trigger the civil commitment
process, the pregnant substance abuser must first fit the definition of
an alcoholic, or, under an amended Uniform Act, a drug addict. The
Uniform Act's narrow definition of alcoholism and drug addiction
thus decreases the risk of arbitrary or erroneous commitment. A
threshold requirement of addiction makes civil commitment a solution
carefully shaped to address gestational substance abuse, thus avoiding
"slippery slope" problems. For example, under the Uniform Act a
woman could not be committed for failing to eat properly, because the
Uniform Act allows state intervention only in the case of substance
addiction.
The Uniform Act's procedural safeguards and limits suit gestational
substance abuse well by providing greater flexibility than criminal
incarceration. Whereas criminal statutes fix the time of incarceration,
the Uniform Act responds to the individual. An alcoholic or addict
may be released when he or she is no longer a danger to others. If the
danger persists, the substance abuser can be recommited. Like the
substantive limits, the procedural safeguards also prevent erroneous or
unjustified commitments. Because the Uniform Act requires a physi-
cian's certification, casual users would not be committed.
Unlike penal incarceration, civil commitment recognizes and fur-
thers the state's interest in protecting the lives and health of both the
woman and the fetus. Civil commitment protects fetal health by treat-
ing the woman's addiction. Criminal incarceration may prevent fur-
ther harmful substance abuse,' 14 but by ignoring the woman's health it
fails to protect fetal health adequately. Nor does criminal incarcera-
tion guarantee treatment."I5 Civil commitment protects fetal health,
or more drugs, loss of control when exposed to one or more drugs, and continued use in spite of
adverse consequences." 1989 WASH. LAWS ch. 271 § 305(2). A similar definition could be
added to the Uniform Act. References to alcoholics in the civil commitment provisions could
simply be amended to include the phrase "or drug addict." See UNIF. ALCOHOLISM AND
INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT, § 14, 9(1) U.L.A. 99 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.96A.140 (1989).
113. For example, the Uniform Act's § 14(a) could be amended to read that the person
sought to be committed "has threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm on another or on
a fetus, and unless committed is likely to inflict physical harm on another or on a fetus"
114. See supra note 106 (jails might not be drug-free).
115. See supra note 107 (Washington version of the Uniform Act does not entitle prisoners to
treatment under the Act).
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yet by making the woman's addiction the paramount concern, civil
commitment treats her as a separate person and not as a mere vessel
for the more-valued fetus.
Because civil commitment lacks a penal purpose, it does not involve
complicated mens rea requirements. 1 6 If the state amends the Uni-
form Act specifically to address gestational substance abuse, the state
may commit once the predicate elements of alcoholism or drug addic-
tion and threat of harm to a viable fetus are met. Thus, the issue of
mens rea is avoided.
Civil commitment also has the advantage of speed. After the filing
of a petition, a commitment hearing must be held promptly." 7 The
criminal process may take much longer. While it is true that much of
the damage to the fetus occurs early in the pregnancy, before the state
can intervene, civil commitment's speedy process prevents additional
harm which might occur during a more lengthy criminal
proceeding. 118
Civil commitment is not without difficulties. Even using civil com-
mitment, the state should not intervene during the first trimester,
despite the severity of the fetal damage during this period. Addition-
ally, as with criminalization, civil commitment will not prevent dam-
age that occurs before the woman suspects she is pregnant. Finally,
civil commitment probably costs more than criminal punishment,
because it involves treatment as well as incarceration. However, as the
Supreme Court noted in Roe, pregnancy is temporary but capable of
being repeated.' 9 Treatment, more than punishment, lessens the like-
lihood of abuse during future pregnancies. In the long run, treatment
may be less expensive than prosecution or inaction, because it lessens
the need for additional interventions, and because it decreases the
number of children damaged by gestational substance abuse.
IV. CONCLUSION
Gestational substance abuse presents troubling questions, and the
law offers no ready answers. The best solution might not involve the
116. Because civil commitment lacks a penal purpose, it does not carry the stigma of
prosecution: "[a] prosecution for addiction, with its resulting stigma and irreparable damage to
the good name of the accused cannot be justified as means of protecting society, where a civil
commitment would do as well." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 677 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
117. See supra note 75.
118. Preventing the woman from using cocaine in the days before delivery can decrease the
risk of fetal strokes. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
119. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125.
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law at all, but rather include increased state funding of drug abuse
prevention and addiction treatment programs. Such programs are
expensive, yet ultimately less costly than the effects of gestational sub-
stance abuse. Voluntary treatment programs avert the dilemma inher-
ent in state intervention: although the United States Constitution
probably does not prohibit early pregnancy intervention, policy and
logic demand that the state not intervene before viability. Yet, tragi-
cally, most of the fetal damage occurs during early pregnancy.
If the state does intervene, it must speak to the real problem, and
not attack its symptoms through highly publicized prosecutions.
Prosecution has recently been the means for addressing gestational
substance abuse, but this is a poor solution. Criminalization is unjusti-
fied by traditional rationales and offers no long-term solution to gesta-
tional substance abuse.
Civil commitment under the Uniform Act offers a better solution.
It strikes to the heart of the issue, contains substantive and procedural
safeguards, and protects the fetus by treating, not punishing, the
woman. The only way the state can protect its future citizens is by
treating its present citizens.
Kristen Rachelle Lichtenberg
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